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Abstract  
In seeking to understand how future societies will be affected by climate change we cannot simply 
assume they will be identical to those of today, because climate and societies are both dynamic. Here 
we propose that the concept of demographic metabolism and the associated methods of multi-
dimensional population projections provide an effective analytical toolbox to forecast important aspects 
of societal change that affect adaptive capacity. We present an example of how the changing educational 
composition of future populations can influence societies’ adaptive capacity. Multi-dimensional 
population projections form the human core of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways scenarios, and 
knowledge and analytical tools from demography have great value in assessing the likely implications 
of climate change on future human well-being.   
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Assessing the likely impacts of climate change on future human well-being requires a 
combination of two kinds of forecasts: how the climate of the future will be different from that 
of today; and how humans and there societies in the future will differ in terms of numbers, 
regional distributions, age structures and, most importantly, their capacities to successfully 
adapt to changing climatic conditions. This includes capacities at multiple levels from 
individual, to household, community and national level as well as the associated qualities of 
institutions and levels of economic development. Much work has been carried out in terms of 
modelling the future climatic conditions1–3, but very little has been done for modelling the future 
socioeconomic conditions. Successful adaptation is also dependent on the qualities of 
institutions and levels of economic development. In this Perspective, we discuss recent 
progress in the latter field, especially in the demographic metabolism model and illustrate the 
potential of multi-dimensional demographic methods for forecasting societies’ adaptive 
capacities to climate change. 
The Working Group II contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report appropriately 
summarizes what was the state of the art on this issue: “Most scenario-based assessments 
superimpose biophysical ‘futures’ onto present-day socioeconomic conditions.”4. While this 
statement is based on many studies that in fact did this – for example, the estimation of the 
likely increase in malaria deaths in Africa by matching the future climate conditions with 
today’s social conditions5 – this is a highly unsatisfactory, if not outright misleading, approach. 
The IPCC report continues saying: “This is useful for assessing how current socioeconomic 
conditions may need to change in response to biophysical impacts but raises inconsistencies 
when future socioeconomic states are out of step with biophysical states”4. While we agree with 
the second part of the statement we disagree with the first one because it is known with near 
certainty that socioeconomic and demographic conditions in the future will be different from 
today. Thus, we see little value in the purely hypothetical exercise of assessing potential impacts 
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of the future climate on a society that will not exist in the future. This may even result in 
misleading assessments.  
In fact, the IPCC report recognizes this problem by saying “An important challenge, therefore, 
is to construct impact assessments in which biophysical futures are coupled with socioeconomic 
futures. A new set of socioeconomic futures, known as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), 
which are storylines corresponding to the new Representative Concentration Pathways, is being 
developed to assist this process”4. In the following Perspective, we further pursue this approach 
and discuss the scientific basis for the human core of the SSPs – the demographic model 
generating the scenarios of changing population size and composition by age, gender and level 
of educational attainment. This has been designed to capture key dimensions of future adaptive 
capacity. We first address the temporal nature of human–climate interactions and describe the 
toolbox of multidimensional population dynamics and the concept of demographic metabolism 
that translates them into measurable social change. We then provide an example of educational 
attainment (as one important population characteristic) and its role in enhancing adaptive 
capacity. We conclude with illustrations of numerical applications of the approach and policy 
recommendations. 
It is important to clarify right at the beginning that in this Perspective we will not address all 
possible consequences of climate change but only those that we consider most dangerous to 
human well-being. These include all threats to human life (death is irreversible), human health 
(in particular serious and lasting disability) and basic human subsistence (for example, the risk 
of absolute poverty which causes higher risk of death and disability). Economic losses that 
affect wealthy people but fall short of pushing them into poverty will not be considered in this 
analysis since they are caused by different mechanisms. For example, the destruction of 
expensive houses by storms that rich people built in highly exposed coastal locations is not 
considered in our approach to studying adaptive capacities. Moreover, there is no consistent 
5 
 
measure of total economic losses6 and the evidence on a negative impact of natural disasters, 
especially on indirect loss, remains inconclusive7. For this reason, our arguments do not relate 
adaptive capacity to potential economic loss. Instead they relate primarily to loss of life, health 
and basic livelihood.    
Temporal associations between society and global climate 
[FIGURE 1: ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 1 illustrates the circular link between the human population including its size and 
structure, socioeconomic development and the global climate system. The two systems interact 
dynamically with a complex lag structure both on the mitigation and adaptation sides of the 
circle.  
The left side of the diagram shows that humans have been causing changes to the climate system 
mostly through the burning of fossil fuels and land use change. This is a cumulative process 
that has been going on at least for a century and will likely continue over the coming decades. 
It is triggered by both the growing number of humans and increasing per person impacts, which 
in turn can be decomposed into income (consumption) and technology effects working in 
opposite directions. A decomposition of these effects is sometimes discussed in terms of the so-
called I=PAT equation (Impact = Population x Affluence x Technology) which has been 
introduced by Ehrlich and Holdren8 and also by Kaya9. It can be quantified in terms of the 
identity CO2 = (population) x (GDP per capita) x (energy per unit of GDP) x (CO2  per unit of 
energy use). Several studies have tried to assess the relative impacts of the three factors which 
turned out to be rather problematic because the three factors are not independent. Technology 
and affluence work in opposite directions and other factors such as household size were shown 
to be equally relevant10,11. There is however no doubt that in a synergistic way, all these human 
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activities together are responsible for the increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere contributing to global warming. 
On the right hand side of Fig. 1, we see the impacts of the changed climate at time t + x on the 
human population. The changes in the climate can directly affect human health and mortality 
(due to natural disasters and changes in the disease environment), and impact on human 
livelihoods as they cascade through the entire economic production chain. In the context of our 
focus on basic subsistence, the effects on farming through changing agricultural productivity 
especially in the context of subsistence farming in less developed countries are of particular 
relevance. These impacts may also trigger migration flows either within countries or to other 
countries. Flooding and sea level rise can also directly drive populations out of certain territories. 
The actual push factors for out-migration will likely result from a complex interplay between 
environmental and economic reasons and political and security conditions. 
The literature on possible climate change induced international migration abounds and tends to 
be rather speculative in nature12. A comprehensive assessment of the scientific evidence  
concludes that while one response to environmental change is to migrate (reflected on the right 
of Fig. 1)13, populations who experience the impacts of environmental change may see a 
reduction in the very capital required to enable a move. In fact, millions of people will be unable 
to move away from locations where they are vulnerable to environmental change. If climate-
driven migration does occur, it will likely be short distance, within national borders14. The net 
result of this on international migration thus is quite uncertain. 
Figure 1 suggests that there are multidecadal lags in the system and the humans causing the 
change through their emissions (at time t) are typically of a different generation to those being 
affected by the consequences (at time t + x). Note, however, that these different generations 
may have different degrees of vulnerability and different capacities and options for adapting to 
climate change.  
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Adaptive capacity is not only linked to the capacities of social and economic systems: 
additionally, there is and will be substantial heterogeneity within populations. Population 
heterogeneity is captured by observable individual characteristics such as age, gender, 
education, income, and place of residence ,which determine a population’s capacity to adapt15. 
In other words, similar to the risk of disease, people living in the same community or even 
within the same household are likely to have differential vulnerability depending on their 
characteristics. Moreover, the composition of the population with respect to these 
characteristics is not static but is changing over time. 
When addressing societies’ future adaptive capacities, we also need to take account of the 
complex interactions between human capital (knowledge and skills embodied in individuals) 
and social capital (institutions, regulations and public policies such as zoning that structure the 
individual adaptive decisions). While social capital facilitates the formation of human capital16, 
it is enhanced human capital that will produce stronger social capital. Good institutions do not 
fall from heaven nor can they be imposed by other powers: they have to evolve from an 
increasingly self-empowered population. There is evidence on how increasing levels of 
education in a population help improve the quality of institutions and bring about democratic 
decision making processes through increasing civic and political participation17–19. While it is 
close to impossible to forecast the quality of specific institutions, there are tools to forecast 
societies level of aggregate human capital, which is a necessary prerequisite for the 
development of such institutions. Indeed, there is a strong statistical association with the 
causality clearly going from better education (comes years before) to higher adult human capital 
with a decadal-scale lag time and, subsequently, better institutions. In this respect, human 
capital, which is forecastable, can be treated as a proxy of institutional capacity, which is more 
difficult to forecast directly. Knowing the future composition of the population with its 
associated capacities will thus assist policy planning including those related to climate change.  
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Population dynamics and demographic metabolism 
In the following, we present a new approach for modelling and forecasting socioeconomic 
change for decades into the future based on the changing composition of populations by relevant 
characteristics (for example, age, gender, level of education, and other stable individual 
characteristics) that matter for future adaptive capacity both at individual and societal levels. 
Unlike economic forecasts and predictions of human behaviour that are rather volatile and 
within a few years can move in totally unexpected directions, demographic forecasts are 
remarkably inert. Population forecasting is reliable over decades because it refers to the slowly 
changing stocks of people with life expectancies of well above half a century and many 
characteristics established at young age (for example, education) that remain unchanged over 
the life course. 
While the tool is demographic in its approach and origin, the applicability goes far beyond what 
are conventionally thought to be demographic questions. To our knowledge, this is the only 
existing tool for relevant quantitative social forecasting at a timescale that is applicable for 
climate change-related analyses.  
Demography studies the changing size and composition of populations. As this scientific 
discipline developed out of what used to be called ‘political arithmetic’, there has been a long 
tradition of forecasting future population trends for all kinds of government policies ranging 
from military to health and education systems. Originally, the approach was to consider the 
population as homogeneous and projection was simply done by applying an assumed growth 
rate to a given initial population size. Although birth and death rates vary strongly with age, 
under conditions of rather stable age structures, this was a useful approximation and it is still 
widely used, for example, in animal demography. For human populations, however, age 
structures in Europe became irregular due to fertility declines and the strong fluctuations in 
births and deaths associated with World War I, the Spanish Flu and the Great Depression. 
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Therefore, since the middle of the twentieth century, most population projections have been 
based on an age-specific model, called the cohort-component model which projects populations 
along cohort lines (for example, the cohort aged 20-24 in 2015 becomes 25-29 in 2020) 
adjusting for the three principal components of population change: fertility, mortality and 
migration. While the model differentiating population by age and gender has been widely used, 
multi-dimensional population models can actually sub-divide populations by further observable 
characteristics that are considered relevant and whose distribution can influence population 
dynamics. In terms of methods, projection is similarly done along cohort lines (e.g. the 
proportion of women with high school graduation aged 25-29 in 2015 is a good predictor of 
women aged 60-64 with high school graduation in 2050 after accounting for mortality and 
migration). Since in most countries both fertility and mortality tend to vary greatly by level of 
education, explicitly accounting for educational differences also changes the population 
forecasts20 . 
This model of population change along cohort lines has also been generalized to a model of 
social change with predictive power called demographic metabolism21. Building on the earlier 
work of the sociologist Karl Mannheim22 and the demographer Norman Ryder23, this concept 
operationalizes the age old view that societies change as a function of new generations, that are 
different in relevant ways, successively replacing older ones. The notion of “demographic 
metabolism” was introduced by Ryder who saw this replacement through new generations with 
different perspectives and characteristics as the only mechanism of social change. In his view 
“a population whose members were immortal would resemble a stagnant pond”24. The 
generalization by Wolfgang Lutz21 further allows for individuals to change over their life cycle 
and thus model the combined effects of new and different cohorts moving up the age pyramid 
as time passes while certain proportions within each cohort change from one sub-population to 
another (such as from secondary to tertiary education). Capturing these movements between 
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different sub-categories of each cohort through a set of age- and gender-specific transition 
probabilities allows for the application of the powerful methods of multi-dimensional 
mathematical demography mentioned above25,26. Hence, the model of demographic metabolism 
can describe and forecast under certain assumptions how societies change as a consequence of 
the changing composition of their members with respect to certain relevant and measureable 
characteristics. 
[FIGURE 2: ABOUT HERE] 
This social change through successive generational replacement can be illustrated in the form 
of three-dimensional age pyramids. For the case of the Republic of Korea, Fig. 2 shows in 
different colours the proportions of men and women in different age groups who have different 
levels of education. In 1970, the Republic of Korea was still a poor developing country with a 
very young population structure and only the younger age groups benefitted from then recent 
education expansions. Virtually all women above the age of 50 had never attended any school. 
For the pyramid in 1990, we clearly see that the entire education pattern has essentially moved 
up the age pyramid by 20 years. By then, the better educated younger cohorts had reached the 
main working ages which also was a factor driving the rapid economic growth of that time27. 
By 2010 the education structure had moved up another 20 years and as a consequence of 
improved female education, birth rates strongly declined. This mechanism of cohorts moving 
up can be extended into the future as the pyramid for 2030 shows. By then, even the elderly in 
Korea will have some education and the uneducated population will essentially disappear. 
This model does not only hold for the changing educational composition. It can also be applied 
to other relevant characteristics that tend to be persistent along cohort lines. For instance, the 
entry of new generations who have grown up being exposed to environmental education and 
post-materialistic values28 can influence environmental attitudes and environmental behaviour 
at the societal level. The concept of demographic metabolism has already been applied to 
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modelling and forecasting the changing prevalence of attitudes towards gender roles29,30, 
homosexuality31 and European identity32,33 where younger and older birth cohorts differ mainly 
because younger generations were socialized in different social environments.  
There are also relevant cohort effects with respect to health. Owing to social and economic 
development over the second half of the twentieth century, there is strong evidence showing 
that younger cohorts, especially those born after 1960 are healthier than the older ones at any 
given age. This pattern is particularly discernible in old age both for physical capability and 
cognitive function34–36. Although the elderly are particularly vulnerable to certain weather 
extremes such as heat waves and population ageing is expected to amplify the risks associated 
with heatwaves37, the process of demographic metabolism suggests that older people in the 
future will not only be better educated but will likely be healthier and have better cognitive 
function than those of today. This implies that the healthier and better informed subsequent 
cohorts will be able to cope better with the health challenges associated with climate change. 
The central role of the changing composition of human populations in socioeconomic 
development thus has significant implications for the ability to cope with the changing climate. 
In fact, adaptation practices have been categorized along different dimensions such as by spatial 
scale, sector, type of action, climatic zone, baseline development level and actor38. Furthermore, 
adaptations involve anticipatory and reactive actions and include adaptation to short-term 
weather variability and extreme events and to longer-term climate change including sea-level 
rise. While heterogeneity in the populations’ characteristics of today determine coping 
responses to current weather variability, anticipating the future population composition through 
the process of demographic metabolism allows for forecasting societies’ capacity to adapt to 
climate change in the longer-term. For instance, changing educational composition in the 
population is highly relevant to societies’ adaptive capacity as explained below.  
Education changes our behaviour and reduces vulnerability 
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Regarding how precisely education contributes to vulnerability reduction, we build the 
argument upon a well-established causal link between education and health39–42. Education 
influences our cognitive function, attitudes and behaviours and equips us with better social and 
economic opportunities. Schooling enhances cognitive development through increasing the 
synaptic density in relevant parts of the brain. Not only experimental and observational studies 
have provided confirmation of a robust effect of education on executive functioning and 
cognitive abilities43–45: neurocognitive and neuroimaging studies have also shown strong 
associations between adaptive changes in the brain and learning experience in classrooms46,47. 
Abstract cognitive skills such as categorization and logical deduction acquired through 
schooling enhance the way educated individuals reason, solve problems, assess risks and make 
decisions48,49 – those skills and qualities that are highly relevant for adapting to climate change. 
Similarly, since education improves knowledge, understanding of complex information, 
efficiency in allocation of resources and capacity to plan for the future50–52, this can help in 
making better choices on adaptation options such as what insurance to take or how to reinforce 
building structure.  
Furthermore, education indirectly reduces vulnerability through mediating factors such as 
improved socioeconomic status and social capital. The increased income, for instance, allows 
people with higher levels of education to make not only the right but also costly strategic 
investments to reduce vulnerability. With greater social capital and larger social networks53,54, 
the more educated also have better access to information and social support which facilitate 
coping responses and undertaking of adaptation measures. Through these direct and indirect 
mechanisms, there is sufficient ground to assume that education plays a role in reducing 
vulnerability and enhancing adaptive capacity. 
A cautionary note is required on the interplay of the effects of education and income on 
vulnerability. There is a widespread view that income or GDP per capita is the most important 
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aspect of socio-economic development and also that it is directly related to vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity. Many empirical studies indeed find an association between the two55–57. The 
alternative hypothesis, however, is that the cognitive enhancement associated with education is 
the common cause of both higher income and economic growth27,58,59 and lower vulnerability. 
The association between income and vulnerability thus is spurious. Testing these contradictory 
hypotheses is beyond the scope of this Perspective. There is however evidence based on a study 
of disaster-related mortality in 167 countries over the period 1970-2010 confirming that female 
education is the most significant factor resulting in fewer deaths from climate-related disasters 
after controlling for the effect of income60. Most extant studies on human loss from climate 
hazards nevertheless commonly consider either only GDP55–57 or a composite indicator such as 
Human Development Index61. In fact, when the latter is decomposed into its three elements 
(income, education and health)62, the results show that countries with higher level of education 
on average did experience lower disaster mortality while income did not play a significant role60.   
In this context, it is also enlightening to look at the rich body of literature studying child 
mortality as an aspect of vulnerability. Multivariate (controlling for many relevant factors) and 
multi-level (stratified by household, community, national level) studies have clearly come to 
the conclusion that for child survival, mothers’ education matters more than household wealth 
as measured by various indicators63,64. Another series of studies has tried to explicitly test the 
importance of education with respect to disaster vulnerability after controlling for income and 
vice versa, asking what matters more, income or education? Generally, the result was that for 
vulnerability, mind matters more than money62,65–68.  
With all this evidence at the micro level, it is not surprising that the vulnerability reducing role 
of education also dominates at the macro level. Recent empirical studies have demonstrated 
consistent evidence showing that countries and communities with higher average levels of 
education experience lower vulnerability to natural disasters69. This applies to both developed 
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and less developed countries as well as different dimensions of vulnerability including 
preparedness and responses to disasters, mortality, morbidity, coping strategies, recovery from 
disasters and other relevant outcomes. With respect to disaster preparedness (measures taken to 
prepare for and reduce the impacts of disaster such as having family evacuation plan, emergency 
supply kit, and disaster insurance), undoubtedly, direct experience of a disaster is one key driver 
of disaster risk reduction efforts. However, in the absence of disaster experience, it has been 
reported that the highly educated exhibit higher level of disaster preparedness thanks to their 
better abstraction skills in anticipating the consequences of disasters i.e. thinking about the 
counterfactual that has not yet been experienced66,70.  Indeed, better disaster preparedness 
among more educated communities can provide protective effects when a disaster strikes. Not 
only were educated individuals more likely to survive and had a lower risk of injuries e.g. from 
the 2004 Indian ocean tsunami71,72, communities and countries with higher average levels of 
education also experienced much lower losses in human lives from climate-related 
disasters60,62,65,73. The protective role of education further extends to morbidity associated with 
natural hazards, especially mental health with more highly educated individuals showing a 
lower prevalence of distress, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder following a 
disaster71,74–76.  
Likewise, since education facilitates decision making related to disaster risk reduction measures 
such as construction practices and location decisions, damages to residential property and 
economic losses are found to be lower in communities and countries with higher mean year of 
schooling or higher literacy rate65,77,78. Furthermore, with better access to loans and credits as 
well as larger assets and social networks which provide a wider portfolio for coping strategies, 
households or communities with higher level of education on average are better able to maintain 
their welfare and level of consumption after being affected by disaster shocks79–83.  
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With respect to adaptation to the changing climate, education is indeed highly relevant since 
individuals with higher level of education are also more likely to have better awareness of 
climate risk84. Given that climate change is a relatively new form of risk and a rather 
sophisticated scientific subject, education facilitates the understanding of new ideas and 
concepts related to climate variability. Accordingly, a wide range of studies reported a higher 
likelihood of carrying out adaptation actions such as changing crop types, planting and 
harvesting dates, methods of farming and using improved type of seed among better educated 
households85–87. Education also increases options to diversify livelihood and sources of income 
when facing climate pressure88. For instance, migration as an adaptation strategy to cope with 
livelihood disruptions due to environmental change often involve more educated members89. 
With the focus of this review on “dangerous” climate change, given the consistent evidence on 
the protective role of education in reducing disaster vulnerability 69, we can conclude that better 
educated societies are more resilient and hold greater adaptive capacity to climate change. This 
insight is relevant when deciding what qualities/characteristics of populations shall be 
forecasted when assessing future adaptive capacities in the context of global socioeconomic 
scenarios used in the analysis of climate change. Because these qualities go far beyond the mere 
consideration of population size – as has been done in earlier work based on the Special Report 
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)90 – the new Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) approach 
has the populations fully stratified by age, gender and level of education.  
Scenarios of future adaptive capacity 
The qualitative narratives of the SSPs describe alternative future worlds with respect to 
socioeconomic development that matters for both mitigation and adaptation challenges. These 
narratives have been translated into consistent quantitative scenarios covering future trends in 
areas ranging from population and education91, to GDP growth92, urbanization93, energy and 
land use. Here we will only focus on what has been termed “the human core of the SSPs”94 
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because it directly addresses the future of human beings, including their changing numbers and 
regional distributions as well as their health and empowerment through education.  
The calibration of the SSPs was carried out in tandem with a major new effort to summarize the 
international state of the art with respect to the drivers of future fertility, mortality, migration 
and education trends. Over 550 international population experts participated in an attempt to 
assess alternative substantive arguments that pertain to future demographic trends. The results 
were subsequently translated into alternative demographic assumptions for all countries of the 
world until 206095. The specifications of these demographic scenarios followed the general 
narratives of the SSPs94. More specifically, the medium scenario of these new expert argument 
based projections – which is considered the most likely in terms of future fertility, mortality, 
migration, and education trends – was set to be identical with SSP2 which reflects a “middle of 
the road” scenario. 
[FIGURE 3: ABOUT HERE] 
Fig. 3 shows the global population and education trajectories for the three SSPs. The scenario 
story lines in SSP1 envisage a rapidly developing world with more education, lower mortality, 
and a more rapid fertility decline in countries with high fertility. For today’s rich OECD 
countries this scenario, based on economic prosperity, assumes medium fertility as couples are 
likely to be better able to realize their childbearing aspirations. SSP3, in contrast, assumes 
increasing global inequality in the context of social and economic stagnation leading to stagnant 
school enrolment rates and retarded demographic transition. For the rich OECD countries, the 
picture is different with adverse economic conditions assumed to result in low fertility. As Fig. 
3 illustrates, by 2050 SSP1 and SSP3 already differ greatly in terms of resulting population size 
and education structures. Total population size will differ by as much as 1.5 billion over the 
coming four decades (8.5 billion for SSP1 and 10.0 billion for SSP3 in 2050). Given the very 
different educational compositions of the world population, it is indeed plausible to assume that 
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these scenarios refer to very different future levels of human well-being. By the end of the 
century, SSP1 depicts a world of less than 7 billion people with a relatively well-educated and 
therefore healthy and wealthy population, who will be better able to cope with the consequences 
of already unavoidable climate change. In contrast, SSP3 shows a world of almost 13 billion 
people who are less educated, less healthy and less wealthy making them more likely to be 
much more vulnerable to environmental change. 
These differences in total population size are mainly due to a different educational composition 
for women of reproductive age because fertility rates differ by level of education, with more 
educated women in developing countries wanting and having better means to actually have 
fewer births. Lutz and KC20 recently showed that by 2050, different education scenarios alone  
result in a difference of about one billion. The SSPs also alter the levels of education-specific 
fertility and thus produce an even larger inter-scenario difference. As can be expected, the 
middle-of-the road SSP2 scenario which essentially assumes a continuation of current trends 
(as they look most likely from today’s perspective) results in an intermediate picture with the 
world population reaching a peak of around 9.4 billion during the second half of this century, 
followed by a slight decline to 9 billion by the end of the century. 
A recent study of disaster fatalities translated estimated determinants of disaster vulnerability 
including education to the SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios for the rest of the century60.  It was shown 
that due to the educational expansion under the rapid social development path in SSP1, disaster 
mortality will be much lower – even in the case of increasing climate related hazard –than in 
the SSP3 scenario where underinvestment in education leads to high population growth and 
heightened vulnerability. 
Discussion and policy implications 
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Despite the theoretical argument and solid empirical evidence showing that ensuring universal 
education can potentially be a powerful measure for reducing “dangerous” impacts of climate 
change on human life, health and basic subsistence, in practice public and internationally driven 
adaptation efforts have been concentrating on hard structural adaptation measures96,97. Hard 
adaptation such as reinforcing buildings or dykes and seawalls are often capital-intensive, large, 
complex and inflexible technology and infrastructure. On the contrary, a soft adaptation path 
involves behavioural changes or planning and policy adaptions, empowering of local 
communities, simple and modular technologies owned by local people as well as natural 
infrastructure such as ecosystems and forests98. Soft adaptation measures hence are less 
expensive and are relatively more flexible to respond to alterations in climate change 
projections. While it has been argued that optimal adaptation paths require synergies between 
hard measures and non-technological adaptation options99,100, being more tangible and visible, 
hard structures remain prominent. Subsequently, analysis of adaptation costs or estimation of 
adaptive capacity typically only consider economic capacity to install hard structural measures 
since this is easier to quantify101,102. Instead, empowerment through education in order to enable 
flexible and informed adaptive decisions in the future should be made a priority in this field. 
Given that investing in human capital not only has a large number of social, economic and 
health benefits but also is an efficient adaptation strategy, knowing the educational distribution 
also implies understanding adaptive capacity of a society to a certain extent. Indeed, we have 
shown that multi-dimensional population projections have a forecasting property, which can be 
incorporated into climate change modelling. Stratification by age, gender and level of education 
is necessary not only because these characteristics matter for population dynamics (that is, 
fertility, mortality and migration) but they are also relevant to vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity. Besides differential vulnerability by education, mortality from extreme climate events 
and natural disasters, for instance, differs substantially by age. For example, with lower capacity 
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to adapt coupled with limited ability to thermoregulate body temperatures, the majority of 
70,000 deaths in 12 European countries during the heat wave in summer 2003 comprised older 
persons aged >65 years103. Likewise, in certain hazard events such as tsunami where physiology 
plays a key role in survivorship, women, children aged<5 and older persons aged>70 years had 
a clear mortality disadvantage104. Mortality risk from flood events, on the other hand, is higher 
for males than for females105,106. Such demographic differential vulnerability needs to be taken 
into account in projections of climate change vulnerability and adaptive capacity. The above 
described SSPs offer a valid way for explicitly incorporating these aspects into assessments of 
future adaptive capacity.  
In conclusion, this Perspective shows that the model of demographic metabolism can be used 
to meaningfully produce forecasts of human and associated socio-economic capabilities for 
several decades into the future. This long time horizon is very different from economic or 
technological forecasts which have much higher uncertainty, even in the shorter term. The 
reason for the longer time horizon of the demographic metabolism model lies in the fact that 
the human life span is now seven to eight decades in most countries. Given that many relevant 
characteristics of people (such as educational attainment and basic attitudes) are formed at 
young ages and tend to be stable over the rest of the life course, we are able to predict adaptive 
capacities associated with these characteristics for many decades ahead. Taking aggregate 
future human capital projected in this way as a proxy for future socio-economic and institutional 
capacity, the demographic metabolism model thus offers a meaningful way to quantitatively 
forecast societies’ future adaptive capacity to climate change. This offers the possibility for 
analyses that actually match future climate conditions with future socio-economic conditions, 
thus avoiding the misleading assumption that the climate of the future will meet the societies of 
today. This is an essential prerequisite for trying to assess how dangerous climate change will 
be for future human well-being.
1 
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Figures and Figure Legends 
 
 
Figure 1: Circular link between human population and global climate systems 
 
  
30 
 
 
Figure 2: Age and education pyramids for Republic of Korea 1970-2030 in 20-year interval. 
Notes: Colours indicate highest level of educational attainment. Children aged 0 to 14 are 
marked in gray. The blue line links the identical birth cohorts at different points in time when 
they are of different ages but maintain their highest education attainment level as it is typically 
established before age 30.  
 
Figure 3: World population scenarios by level of educational attainment to 2100 on the basis of 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP1, SSP2, SSP3). Source for base year95 and for the 
scenarios91. 
 
